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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joshua Lee Riggins challenges the district court's order reconsidering a 
prior grant of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reinstating his guilty plea to 
possession of methamphetamine. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Riggins with possession of methamphetamine, 
possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 76-77.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Riggins pied guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine and the state dismissed the misdemeanors. (R., pp. 93-94, 
107-08.) At the sentencing hearing Riggins requested and received a 
continuance so he could file a motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p. 109; see also 
6/2/14 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 12-25 (after reading the PSI "recently" Riggins "just prior to 
coming to court" for sentencing indicated he wished to withdraw his plea).) The 
record contains no actual motion to withdraw the plea, however. (See R. 1) The 
prosecution nevertheless responded, asserting there was no constitutional defect 
in the plea and that the state would be prejudiced by the delay of the case and 
the dismissal of the misdemeanors. (R., pp. 114-19.) 
At the hearing, the district court called Riggins as a witness and asked him 
to "explain to me the reason that you're seeking to withdraw this plea." (6/20/14 
1 In his brief on appeal, Riggins cites "R., pp. 110-11" for the proposition that a 
motion to withdraw the plea was filed. (Appellant's brief, p. 2.) Those pages of 
the record contain Riggins' trial counsel's motion to withdraw on the basis that 
Riggins "has indicated he wishes to withdraw his plea." (R., p. 110.) 
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Tr., p. 5, Ls. 12-19.) Riggins asserted that he was innocent. (6/20/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 
24 - p. 6, 14.) The district court orally allowed Riggins to withdraw the guilty 
plea. (6/20/14 Tr., p. 6, L.15-p. 7, L.11; R., p. 134.) 
The state subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, reasserting that 
it was prejudiced and presenting a new claim of prejudice arising from the 
unavailability of the officer and primary witness due to his change in employment 
to outside the state. (R., pp. 153-58.) On reconsideration the district court 
concluded there had been "no basis for Mr. Riggins to withdraw his plea" and 
there was "substantial prejudice to the State," so it reinstated the guilty plea. 
(8/22/14 Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 6, L. 4; R., pp. 160-64.) Riggins filed a timely notice 
of appeal from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 195, 208.) 
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ISSUE 
Riggins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for 
reconsideration because the court did not have the authority to 
reinstate Mr. Riggins' guilty plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Riggins failed to show that reconsidering the order granting his 
motion to withdraw his plea and eventually reinstating that plea was fundamental 
error? 
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ARGUMENT 
It Was Not Fundamental Error To Reconsider Granting The Motion To Withdraw 
The Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Riggins asserts, for the first time on appeal (see 8/22/14 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 13-
19), that the district court lacked authority to reconsider its order granting 
withdrawal of his guilty plea (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-8). This argument fails 
because Riggins has not demonstrated a constitutional right, clear error on the 
record, or prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial, he must show fundamental 
error on appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires the defendant to 
demonstrate that (1) "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated"; (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the 
record, "without the need for any additional information" including information "as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision"; and (3) "the error affected 
the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability 
that the error "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." kl at 226, 245 P.3d 
at 978 (footnote omitted). 
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C. Riggins Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Of The Three Prongs Of 
Fundamental Error 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which 
provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or 
imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of 
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentencing, the 
district court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 
530, 536, 211 P.3d 775, 781 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 
959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). If the plea was voluntary, in the 
constitutional sense, then the court must determine whether other just cause 
exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 
211 P.3d at 781. "A mere assertion of innocence, by itself, is not grounds to 
withdraw a guilty plea." kl at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (internal citations omitted). A 
district court may also consider prejudice to the state in determining whether to 
permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 
411, 414, 744 P.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 
536, 211 P.3d at 781 ("Once the defendant has met this burden [of showing just 
cause], the state may avoid withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the 
existence of prejudice."). 
The district court concluded that the guilty plea was constitutionally proper. 
(R., p. 163; 8/22/14 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 6-19.) Riggins' assertion of innocence (6/20/14 
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Tr., p. 5, L. 24 - p. 6, L. 14) did not constitute just cause to withdraw the guilty 
plea. Finally, the court found prejudice to the state. (R, p. 164.) 
On appeal Riggins does not claim that the district court abused its 
discretion by ultimately denying his motion to withdraw. Rather, he claims for the 
first time that the district court had no discretion, because it was barred from 
reconsidering its initial ruling granting the motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-8.) He 
acknowledges his burden of demonstrating fundamental error on appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) He argues that upon granting the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea the district court returned him to the "status quo ante," undoing his 
waivers of constitutional rights, and the court lacked the authority to reinstate 
these waivers. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-8.) This argument fails on all three 
prongs of the fundamental error test. 
First, Riggins has failed to show any constitutional prohibition on a court's 
reconsideration of an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea. The only 
authority he cites, Williams v. State, 762 So.2d 990 (Fla. Ct. App. Fourth Dist., 
2000) (cited at Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6), relies upon a Florida procedural rule. 
Riggins does not cite to, and the state is unaware of, any constitutional right 
implicated in, much less violated by, reconsideration of an order granting a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Second, there was no clear error. Although Florida bars reconsideration 
as a matter of procedure, such procedural prohibitions are not universal. Other 
courts have held that a trial court may reconsider an order allowing withdrawal of 
a guilty plea. See, ~. United States v. Farrah, 715 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 
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1983) ("the lower court possessed the authority to reconsider its order" 
withdrawing the guilty plea); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3 rd Cir. 1973) 
("so long as the district court has jurisdiction over the case, it possesses inherent 
power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant 
with justice to do so"); People v. Wilkins, 362 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Mich. App. 
1985) (court had authority on reconsideration to reinstate defendant's guilty 
plea). No Idaho case has addressed this question. Other jurisdictions clearly 
allow reconsideration of an order granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Finally, no court has ever held there was a constitutional bar to reconsideration. 
There was, therefore, no clear error as a matter of law. 
The final element of the fundamental error claim is prejudice. Here the 
district court abused its discretion when it initially granted the motion. The sole 
basis for the motion was a claim of innocence, which is not a legal basis for 
allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea. Because the only prejudice Riggins asserts 
is the right to retain an erroneous ruling, he has shown no prejudice. 
Riggins claims for the first time on appeal that the district court lacked 
authority to reconsider its order granting the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Because he did not raise the issue below he must show fundamental error. He 
has not done so because the error he claims is not of constitutional dimension, 
the error is not clear as a matter of law, and he was not prejudiced because the 
withdrawal was improvidently granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2015. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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